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1 The Importance of Inquiry for Understanding (Ancient) Philosophy
At least since Socrates, philosophy has been understood as the desire for acquiring a special kind of knowledge, namely
wisdom, a kind of  knowledge that human beings ordinarily do not possess. According to ancient thinkers this desire
may result from a variety of causes: wonder or astonishment, the bothersome or even painful realization that one lacks
wisdom, or encountering certain hard perplexities or  aporiai. As a result of  this basic understanding of  philosophy,
Greek thinkers  tended to  regard philosophy as  an activity  of  inquiry (zētēsis)  rather than as a specific  discipline.
Discussions concerning the right manner of  engaging in philosophical inquiry – what  methodoi or routes of  inquiry
were best suited to lead one to wisdom – became an integral part of ancient philosophy, as did the question how such
manners  or  modes  of  inquiry  are  related  to,  and  differ  from,  other  types  of  inquiry,  for  instance  medical  or
mathematical.
In this special issue of  History of  Philosophy & Logical Analysis, we wish to concentrate in particular on ancient
modes of inquiry.1 But, the reader may wonder, why do we talk about modes of inquiry, rather than methods? There are
at least two reasons for this. First, the modern term ‘method’ gives connotations of something wider than inquiry: we
talk of  various methods for doing something, or for going about something, without thereby implying that we are
directly engaged in inquiry into something. In another sense, however, method is narrower than inquiry; for a method
proper prescribes in a strongly regulative way how to proceed in order to get from an initial state to another state.
Whether there are any such prescriptions for philosophical inquiry is an open question, both now and in antiquity.
Most ancient philosophers would agree,  however, that there are,  as it  were,  small-scale methods or techniques in
philosophy, for instance the method or technique of  disproving a claim by counterexample; and they would further
agree that such methods play some role in inquiry. However, most real philosophical inquiries are far too complex to
be carried out by relying on only one such method or technique. A proper method of philosophical inquiry would thus
at least require a description of how these specific individual techniques can be combined. But even if no such large-
scale method can be discovered in philosophy, philosophical inquiry may still be possible and facilitated by certain
modes or elements in a general account of such inquiry. This latter possibility is especially important for the sceptical
school of the Pyrrhonists, who were keen on claiming that they were engaged in inquiry without subscribing to any of
the various methodoi which had been developed up to this point, and, in fact, to any specific method of inquiry at all. It
1 In the past years, a number of seminal contributions in relation to inquiry in ancient philosophy have been published; see, for instance, Fine
(2014), Politis (2015) or Karamanolis & Politis (2018).
is also important because, for all the various modes or routes of inquiry discovered in antiquity, philosophy remained,
at any rate wide and for many of the then philosophers, and to use a somewhat worn expression, a way of life or, more
precisely, a type of  life lived in pursuit of  happiness. The modes of  inquiry remained subservient to this; some stoics
even suggested that the tools necessary for inquiry, in particular logic, could become a hindrance for philosophy if
pursued merely for its own sake. 
Inquiry is, we contend, not only one of the many interesting aspects that one needs to investigate in order to get a
complete picture of a philosopher or a philosophical era (such as, for instance, the various views on nature, the mind,
or the best life); rather, we believe that understanding inquiry is crucial for our understanding of  philosophy, and in
particular of ancient philosophy. One of the reasons for this is that the modes of inquiry a given philosopher chooses
will – for better or worse – enable or disable him or her to discover certain truths (an empiricist will never be able to
discover Aristotle’s first principles), and it will shape the results he or she may eventually come to. In this sense we
could say that  the study of  inquiry is  even more fundamental  than metaphysics  – that  is,  if  we hadn’t  absorbed
Aristotle’s lesson on the inseparability of the various aspects of metaphysics and indeed his account (in book III of the
Metaphysics) that metaphysics, or simply philosophy or first philosophy, is inquiry-based.
As  important  as  inquiry  may  be  to  understand  the  philosophy  of  a  particular  thinker,  of  an  era,  or  even  of
philosophy in general, inquiry itself sometimes appears to lack properties that we think of as important for philosophy.
It  is  commonly  contended,  for  instance,  that  philosophy requires  consistency;  yet,  inquiry  may well  proceed via
inconsistencies. Moreover, some modes of inquiry may be entirely different from what is now, and in general, accepted
as forming a part of  philosophy. A possible example that comes to mind is Plato’s use of  myths, assuming, for the
moment, that Plato uses myths to enable further progress in an inquiry concerned with a given philosophical matter. 2
These somewhat surprising connections between the modes of  inquiry and their results are one of  the reasons why
inquiry is such a fascinating research topic.
We  contend  that  understanding  the  various  modes  of  inquiry  a  given  thinker  may  employ  is  crucial  for
understanding the philosophy of  that thinker, and we think this is true for all eras and branches of  philosophy. But
perhaps ancient philosophy occupies a special place here, at least within western philosophy. While later traditions
(for instance, the scholastic philosophy of  the middle ages) relied to a great extent on the modes of  inquiry that had
been established in previous centuries, ancient philosophy, and in particular the early phase of ancient philosophy (at
least up to and including Aristotle), had to lay the foundations. It is true, of  course, that later philosophers (we are
thinking of  obvious examples such as  Descartes and Husserl)  also were keenly interested in the question of  how
philosophical inquiry ought to proceed. But the situation is markedly different, since these later thinkers developed
their views on inquiry in opposition to established traditions, while the ancient philosophers were creating something
entirely new – especially when it comes to the modes of  inquiry – and they were aware of  themselves as innovators
and groundbreakers.
There are, therefore, at least two purposes for which studying philosophical inquiry in antiquity promises to be
fruitful: (1) to understand philosophy in its incipient moment; (2) to understand a crucial condition (the chosen mode
of inquiry) under which the respective ancient philosophers posed the questions and defended the answers they did
pose and defend. Such observations have direct relevance for students of ancient philosophy. We believe, however, that
studying the ancient philosophers’ approaches to the questions and problems of inquiry can also (3) be beneficial for
philosophers concentrating on other periods of  philosophy, as well as for systematic philosophers.  For the unique
2 For Plato, of  course, the use of  myths are not the only (or even the most important) mode of  inquiry. For a general account of  Platonic
inquiry, focussing especially on the so-called early dialogues, see Politis (2015).
situation the ancient philosophers found themselves in demanded unique reactions that are worth being considered
by anyone interested in philosophical inquiry.
2 A Tentative Map of Inquiry
We think it  is  worth providing a map of  the various issues pertaining to our topic,  even though it  will  be,  in all
likelihood, incomplete. On the one hand, such a map will provide a framework for the individual contributions to this
volume, some of which are highly specialized studies. On the other hand we hope that the map will provide a stimulus
for further research, especially by highlighting the rather large areas that have not been touched on by the publications
collected in this volume.
An entry-point into such a map that suggests itself  is the question ‘What makes philosophical inquiry special and
how it is different, if  it is different, from other forms of  inquiry? ’. At a general level, this is a question that is central to
contemporary philosophy as well: in contrast to almost all other disciplines, the question of  how one should define
philosophy in order to set it apart from other intellectual activities is integral to philosophy itself. When it comes to the
more specific question of  what sets philosophical inquiry apart from other types of  inquiry, we are thinking of  four
principal  forms  of  inquiry  that  would  need  to  be  distinguished  from  one  another:  pre-philosophical  inquiry,
philosophical inquiry, scientific inquiry, and everyday inquiry. One does not have to follow Wilhelm Nestle’s infamous
Vom Mythos zum Logos in order to agree that the thinking – and with it, the mode of inquiry – of the first authors we
tend to call “philosophers” is in a significant way different from those that came before. For instance, while there is a
connection between the genealogical accounts of the world found in Hesiod’s Theogony and the attempt of the early
Greek philosophers to decide what the “principle” or beginning of everything is (water, for instance, or the Unlimited),
it can hardly be denied that the way these two types of inquiry proceed differ significantly from each other.3
The second form of inquiry we want to demarcate from philosophical inquiry is the inquiry that we engage in on
an everyday basis. In his Confessions (X, 18, 27), Augustine illustrates his own search for God with the parable from Luke
15:8 about the woman who lost a drachma and lit a lamp in order to search for it. She would not have been able to find
it,  Augustine points out, unless she had remembered it. This, one may argue, illustrates a general point about the
conditions of everyday inquiry well known from Plato’s Meno: if you do not know what you are looking for, you will not
be able to find it (see  Meno 80d5–e5). But in contrast to the everyday activity of  searching for, and inquiring into,
something, philosophical inquiry stands out, it may be argued, by the fact that philosophers in general reflect on the
conditions  of  inquiry  enabling  them to  inquire  in  the  first  place.  So,  while  everyday  inquiry  should  share  many
properties  with  philosophical  inquiry  (perhaps  even more  than the  latter  shares  with  pre-philosophical  inquiry),
getting clear  on the distinctions between the two promises  to  be fruitful  for  our understanding  of  philosophical
inquiry. 
The third and last  form of  inquiry that  we wish to distinguish from philosophical  inquiry,  which is  scientific
inquiry, requires a little more description. The term ‘scientific’ and its cognate ‘science’ are notoriously problematic
when it comes to ancient philosophy. They are often used to translate epistēmē, the term used for the highest kind of
knowledge by Aristotle. In this sense, of  course, scientific inquiry and philosophical inquiry shouldn’t be distinct, if
indeed philosophy is to help us achieve wisdom, and wisdom is  epistēmē.  A related problem is the demarcation of
disciplines: sciences like biology, chemistry, or mechanics are nowadays strictly distinguished from philosophy, but in
antiquity the distinction, at least in name, is not always so clear. Nevertheless, the modes of inquiry of philosophy and
those of other disciplines are, in large part at any rate, distinct and this fact did not escape the ancient philosophers –
3 Note that by using the term ‘pre-philosophical’ we do not mean to say that whatever kind of thinking and inquiring is referred to with that
designation has ceased to exist with the advent of philosophy.
such a distinction is perhaps discussed most clearly, and probably also most famously, by Plato in the Republic, when
he sets apart philosophical and mathematical inquiry (see especially 510b4–511d5). We therefore stand to gain insights
into the nature of the philosophical modes of inquiry, if we investigate them in relation to the inquiry taking place in
other disciplines (like mathematics, biology, astronomy, medicine, etc., but also e.g. music or history). 
Even more important might be the ancient philosophers’ discussions of  other disciplines and their observations
regarding any differences between these disciplines and philosophy. We have already mentioned Plato and his verdict
on the difference between mathematical and philosophical inquiry in the Republic, but other authors come to mind,
too. At the beginning of  the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle observes that one would speak adequately if one obtains the
clarity that is appropriate for the subject matter investigated; for one should not seek precision in the same way in all
types  of  discourse.  In  other  words,  if  the  inquiry  is  concerned  with  a  subject  matter  that  does  not  allow  for
mathematical precision, one should not demand that the inquiry arrives at such precision (see  Nicomachean Ethics
I.3). Conversely, the position of the scientists vis-à-vis philosophy is likewise important. In the opening chapters of the
Hippocratic treatise  On Ancient Medicine,  for example, the writer contrasts his own investigation of  disease and its
causes with that of other writers who engage in metaphysical speculation as part of their inquiries.4 
A  related  question  is  the  relationship  of  inquiry,  and  the  account  of  inquiry,  and  epistemology.  Classically,
epistemology is primarily concerned with the question of what knowledge is (and related concepts, like, for instance,
justification), and often questions about how we may acquire knowledge (for instance, by discovering the dependence
of a property on an essence) play into answering the primary question and thus are part of epistemology. The explicitly
formulated  epistemologies  of  the ancient  period,  like  Aristotle’s  Posterior  Analytics,  which has  a  lot  to  say  about
knowledge and its acquisition, may be thought of as including the treatment of  inquiry. However, it appears, to stick
with the example of Aristotle, that for him philosophical inquiry is different from the theory described in the Posterior
Analytics.5 This is true both for the inquiries that Aristotle himself  undertook and which we can find in his extant
works,  but  also  for  his  explicit  statements  on  how  one  should  go  about  philosophical  inquiry  (for  instance,  in
Metaphysics III.1). 
While we think that, pending any conclusive arguments to the contrary, the study of philosophical inquiry is not
absorbed by general epistemology, it is obvious that there are very strong relationships between the two fields that
need to be explored. These concern questions such as: Is the concept of knowledge dependent or independent of the
concept of  inquiry and  vice versa? What is the epistemological status of  those iHowevertems in an inquiry that, all
going well, lead up to the desired goal, knowledge? The above-mentioned peculiarity, namely, that inquiry does not
necessarily need to proceed via known truths, or not via truths at all, and may yet lead, or contribute to leading, non-
accidentally, to truth and knowledge, belongs here. And it may not even be necessary, as we said, that the inquiry
observes consistency-requirements. 
Another aspect  of  inquiry worth considering in connection with the question how inquiry and epistemology
connect is what mental traits are conducive to achieving knowledge and wisdom. In the Republic  (see 503c1–d8 and
535a9–c9)  and  the  Theaetetus (144a1–b6),  Plato  lists  a  number  of  virtues  as  being  of  crucial  importance  for
philosophical inquiry and, more generally, for acquiring knowledge, including: good memory, gentleness, and courage.
In addition to concerns more in step with classical epistemology, e.g. regarding the nature of knowledge, Plato thought
4 Throughout its history, philosophers have shown a continuous interest in the practice of their intellectual neighbours, which has certainly
reached its peak so far in the 20th and 21st centuries, a period that has not only seen the most intensive philosophical reflections on the
sciences and their methods like mathematical physics, but also a previously unknown desire on the part of the philosophers to emulate the
practices of the sciences.
5 By this statement we neither want to suggest a developmentalist reading of  Aristotle’s work nor claim that the concepts developed in the
Posterior  Analytics are  inapplicable to philosophy.  Rather,  we think that  the  Posterior  Analytics is  not  primarily  about  inquiry,  no less
philosophical inquiry.
essential the question which virtues or excellent character traits are required for the type of inquiry that will, ideally,
lead to knowledge and wisdom. Aristotle held similar views, one may argue, in the Nicomachean Ethics (see NE 1095a4–
11), as he claims that only those who have already acquired a suitable moral upbringing will be able to benefit from the
inquiry into the best possible life. 
These questions, how epistemology and inquiry are related, and what virtues are required, if any, for conducting a
successful inquiry, are still – or again – part of  the contemporary discussion, even if  they have, arguable, been less
central to the debates of the 20th and the 21st century than some believe they should have been.6 
There are a number of further fields of  inquiry-related topics that are of crucial importance to ancient modes of
philosophical inquiry. Since we are unsure whether they can be grouped into larger regions we will simply go through
them in turn and order, noting, wherever possible, common borders with other regions.
A central concern of Plato’s was, as mentioned, to demarcate philosophical inquiry from mathematical inquiry. For
Plato,  this  demarcation  depends  on  his  conception  of  dialektikē,  the  “science  of  discourse”  (Soph.  253d1–3)  that
constitutes what we may, with Charles Kahn, call the “technical heartland” of  Platonic philosophy (1996, 292). At its
most basic level, Platonic dialectic may be described as a specific way of  inquiring into something via questions and
answers, a procedure that according to Plato mirrors the nature of  discursive thought (dianoia): to think discursively
consists in posing questions to oneself  about something one inquires into or investigates and in seeking answers to
these questions (Theaetetus 189e6–190a7, see also Sophist 263e3–5 and compare with Gorgias 449b4–8 and Protagoras
334c8–336d5). Such inquiries, it is commonly claimed, should ideally terminate in definitions; definitions not only of
our words and concepts, but also, and primarily, of  the phenomena designated by our words and concepts. Two key
procedures for successful inquiry Plato recommends is to distinguish things that look alike but are not and to recognize
likeness in things that may not look alike (see  Phaedrus 265d3–266b1 and Sophist 253d1–3),7 procedures commonly
referred to as the method of  collection and division. What precisely collection and divisionHowever entails and how
one is to proceed when one is engaged in it, is still a question of much debate. 
Rightly or wrongly (we think wrongly), inquiry through questions and answers and the procedures of  collection
and division are sometimes seen as two versions of  what is now called conceptual analysis. However that may be,
conceptual analysis is certainly an important topic for anyone interested in philosophical inquiry, as are the other
forms  of  analysis,  such  as  mathematical  or  regressive  analysis,  which  have  been  claimed  to  have  been  a  great
methodological inspiration for Plato,8 and possibly also for Aristotle.9
A further procedure central to Plato’s  conception of  dialectic,  and one that has been argued to have a direct
connection to  mathematical  analysis  (see  Menn  2002),  is  the  dialectician’s  ability  to  use  hypothetical  reasoning,
commonly referred to as the hypothetical method (see e.g. Phaedo 99d4–100e3). It is controversial how this method is
to be understood and whether or not Plato changed his conception of it over time. At its most simple level, however,
the uses of hypotheses in Plato consists in inquiring into something by investigating what follows from assuming that
something and also what follows from not assuming it (see Parm. 136a4-c5). At this level of generality, it is perhaps fair
to say that the method foreshadows the later hypothetico-deductive method. 
One of the more curious modes of inquiry can be seen in Aristotle’s so-called endoxic method. According to the
endoxic method, one of the early steps of an inquiry is the collection of endoxa (reputable opinions). What precisely is
6 See Turri et al. (2017).
7 It  is  a  controversial  matter  how  the  various  procedures  that  are  mastered  by  the  dialectician  -  in  particular  collection  and division,
hypothetical reasoning, and refutations arrived at through questions and answers - fit  together.  We neither presuppose that they all fit
together in one science nor that Plato developed and changed his understanding of  them over time, but merely indicate that they are all
described as belonging to this science in various Platonic dialogues.  
8 For analysis and philosophy in general, see Beaney (2014a); for analysis in ancient philosophy see Beaney (2014b). 
9 Nicomachean Ethics 1112b15–24; see Hintikka & Remes (1974, 1) .
supposed  to  happen  with  these  endoxa is  not  entirely  clear,  despite  a  seemingly  straightforward  prescription
(Nicomachean Ethics 1145b2–7), according to which the truth of  these endoxa or at least a subset of  them (either the
majority or the most authoritative of them) have to be proven. It seems important that Aristotle, in the Topics (100a25–
30), identifies a type of deduction that proceeds from endoxa and calls it dialectical. It is controversial how we are to
understand Aristotle’s conception of dialectic, but, since many of Aristotle’s own philosophical inquiries seem to take
as their point of  departure  endoxa  (see e.g. Wieland 1962, Irwin 1989),  endoxa appear to play an important role in
philosophical inquiry according to Aristotle. 
A special case of  the endoxic method, or some variant of  it, is the use of  the history of  philosophy. The most
famous example of such an approach to inquiry is without doubt Aristotle’s review and criticism of his predecessors in
the  Metaphysics and in the  Physics,  but  recourse to  philosophers  of  the past  can also be noted before and after
Aristotle. In the case of Plato, it is perhaps even easier to see how he employs other philosophers (e.g. Heraclitus and
Parmenides) in his own investigation (see  Theaetetus  179c1–184b1 and  Sophist 242c4–245e8): accurate doxography is
much less important than the possibility to advance the inquiry. In later antiquity we meet a special variant of the use
of the history of philosophy as a mode of inquiry, namely the exegesis and commentary, which characterizes both the
Peripatetic (e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias) as well as the Neoplatonic (e.g. Proclus) schools of this period. The history
of philosophy and its employment in ancient authors connects, at least in the case of Aristotle, with another question,
also  debated  in  contemporary  philosophy  (see  e.g.  Chalmers  2015),  namely  whether  or  not  there  is  progress  in
philosophy. This question concerns the very nature of philosophical inquiry, for it asks whether philosophical inquiry
is fundamentally different from other forms of  inquiry, and especially empirical inquiry, which quite clearly shows
progress. 
A related mode of  inquiry is the use of  intuitions, i.e., to contrast with the endoxic method, not the reputable
opinions of  authorities on the subject, but our own or those of  the agora-goer. Intuitons of  course play a big role in
contemporary experimental philosophy. For the ancient period, one could point to examples in Plato. One example
would be Anytus’ claim that sophists are “the ruin and corruption of  those who associate with them” ( Meno 91c4–5;
trans. Long-Sedley), a claim advanced despite the fact that Anytus has not had any personal dealings with sophists
(92b7–c5).  Another  would  be  Socrates’  use  of  common  intuitions  about  what  is  right  or  wrong  in  dialectical
encounters,  for instance when he asks Polus  whether he accepts that  committing injustice is,  if  not  bad,  at  least
shameful (Gorgias 474c5–9). This is a common move Socrates makes, in order to use those intuitions accepted by his
interlocutors  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  position  they  are  defending.  One  could  also  point  to  Aristotle’s
Metaphysics (982a6–10), in which one of  the early steps of  his inquiry into the nature of  wisdom is represented by a
recording of the “assumptions” (hupolēpseis) one has about the character traits of the wise man. Intuitions also served
an important role in the examples used by the hellenistic schools to corroborate their own positions or refute those of
their contenders.10  
One of  the most fascinating modes of  inquiry and central to philosophy as conceived of  by at least Plato and
Aristotle  is  the  use  of  aporiai  (puzzles  or  difficulties).11 The  idea  that  thinking  carefully  about  puzzles  or  hard
difficulties may promote philosophical inquiry is, of  course, central to modern philosophy as well – one need only
mention Russell's “On Denoting” or Husserl’s  Prolegomena.  To illustrate how this mode of  inquiry works in ancient
philosophy,  we  may  note  that  Plato’s  dialogues  commonly  depict  inquiries  into  various  opinions  entertained  by
Socrates’ interlocutors and that such inquiries typically lead, at one point or another, to a serious problem, an aporia,
because it becomes clear that the opinion investigated entails something that conflicts with certain other opinions we
10 See Ierodiakonou (2018), 39–40.
11 For the Platonic and Aristotelian use of aporiai in inquiry, see in particular Politis (2003, 2004, 2006, 2015) and Karamanolis & Politis 2018.
have reasons for accepting. To illustrate the point with the  Protagoras: At the beginning of  an inquiry, we may have
good reasons for believing that virtue is something that can be taught; in the process of  the inquiry, however, good
reasons for believing that it cannot be taught come to light and we therefore end up in aporia, being in an impasse (for
a more detailed analysis, see Politis 2008 and Politis 2012). But situations where we appear to have good reasons for
accepting mutually exclusive opinions are not an impediment to philosophical inquiry. On the contrary, both Aristotle
and Plato recognize that such situations set in motion the deepest philosophical inquiries (compare Theaetetus 154b1-
155d7 with Metaphysics III.1, 994a24–995b4). Certain aporiai, then, are very valuable for philosophical inquiry, at least
according to Plato and Aristotle, and perhaps they are even necessary for some kinds of  philosophical  inquiry as
Aristotle remarks in the Metaphysics (III.1, 995a24). 
A different aspect of dialectical inquiry worth considering is the use of examples. Examples, it might seem, are apt
to impede philosophical inquiry. For an example is by its nature something particular and often drawn from the realm
of  perceptibles, while philosophical inquiry, at least as some philosophers conceive of  it, is concerned with what is
universal and hence non-perceptible. On the other hand, we are unable to experience the world except through our
senses and it is, one may argue, impossible for us to conceive of anything in complete isolation from what is particular
and sense-perceptible. This curious difficulty was not unknown to ancient philosophers. A particularly interesting case
is Plato. In the Phaedo, Plato’s Socrates insists that knowledge is concerned with what is non-percepticle and even that
the inquiry directed at what is non-perceptible should, to the extent possible, avoid relying on sense-perception at all
(see 65e7–66a7).12 In the Statesman, on the other hand, it is remarked that it is difficult to point out any of the biggest
matters (for instance what statesmanship is) without using examples (277d1–4). It is further suggested that someone
who  understands  one  of  these  matters  may use  sense-perceptible  examples  to  help  someone  who  does  not  yet
understand it by pointing to the structural similarity between a sense-perceptible example and what it is meant to
exemplify; in this way, examples may help human beings in becoming more dialectical (see 285d5–7 and 287a3). This
way of  proceeding, one may argue, is characteristic of  Plato’s Socrates – for he commonly brings in examples in the
dialogues that are simple and easy to understand for the purpose of illustrating essential features of something that is
not easy to understand. 
A special kind of  example can be seen in the thought-experiment. 13 While this mode of  inquiry is not nearly as
often used in antiquity as it is in contemporary philosophy, which has seen the emergence of entire genres of thought-
experiments (like the trolley-problems), ancient philosophers nevertheless employed this mode from time to time:
thought-experiments  like  the  ship  of  Theseus,  Plato’s  ring  of  Gyges,  and  Zeno’s  paradoxes  regularly  attract  the
attention of modern critics.14 Others, like Plotinus’ eye of the universe (Enneads IV.5,3 and 8), which supposes that the
universe has an eye and asks what, if anything, it would see if it looked outside of itself, are less well-known. Whether
these diverse philosophers took to the mode of thought-experiment for the same or different purposes, and how their
respective inquiries proceed, are questions the answers to which promise to be illuminating for the student of inquiry.
It  has,  finally,  been suggested that  there is  a special  case of  thought-experiment in antiquity,  namely myths. 15
Whether or not this suggestion is correct, it is undeniable that some ancient philosophers avail themselves of mythical
story-telling in their works and do so, one may argue, for the purpose of inquiring into controversial subject-matters.
12 See Politis (forthcoming) and his contribution to this volume.
13 What precisely thought experiments are, how many different kinds of them can be distinguished, and which roles thought-experiments can
or cannot play, is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy. See e.g. Stuart et al. (2018).
14 For thought-experiments in ancient philosophy in general, with particular emphasis on the Hellenistic Schools, see Ierodiakonou (2005,
2011, and 2018); for Plato, see Becker (2018), and for Aristotle, see Corcilius (2018). It is possible to see a connection between the hypothetical
mode of reasoning discussed above and the use of thought-experiments; for more on this, see Ierodiakonou (2018, 33-34).
15 For a discussion of myth and thought-experiments in Plato, see Becker (2018, especially 45–46 and 48–50); for Plato’s myths more generally,
see for instance Brisson (1998); Janka & Schäfer (2002); Partenie (2009); Collobert et al. (2012).
This mode of inquiry, if it is indeed such a mode, is most readily associated with Plato’s dialogues, where both Socrates
and Plato’s other main characters appear to use myths for the purpose of elucidating a particular difficult matter. Two
examples may suffice. In the Timaeus, the main character of the dialogue after which it is named, engages in a grand
myth or, more precisely, a “likely story” (see 29d2) about the creation and structure of  the universe, a story that one
might regard as thought-experiment: what would the world look like if it was in fact ordered by divine reason the way
Anaxagoras had suggested. In the Statesman the question what true statesmanship is is investigated through the myth
of  the reversed cosmos (268e4–274e3) that again may be regarded as a thought-experiment: if  we assume that the
world is not guided by divine providence, as it may have been in a long forgotten past, but is rather a place wherein
human beings must toil and invent various types of crafts in order to survive at all, what will true statesmanship look
like? Other myths set out in Plato’s dialogues fit the thought-experiment hypothesis less well, however. The myths
about the afterlife, for instance, found in the Gorgias, the Phaedo, and the Republic, seem to reveal something about the
nature of human beings in a “non-scientific” manner of discourse, as does the myth about the original state of human
beings in Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium.   
Concluding this overview of  various inquiry-related topics, we return to those specific small-scale methods we
mentioned in the beginning. These may not only be employed with a view to achieving a specific task or step in a
greater endeavor, such as falsifying an all-quantified claim by counterexample, but may also be counted as elements in
a group of  devices which might help a philosopher to discover possible ways forward in an inquiry. This group of
heuristics  will  likely  prove  to  be  very  heterogeneous,  possibly  comprising  such  diverse  elements  as  graphical
representations (e.g. Socrates’ use of geometrical drawings in Plato’s Meno), general techniques of thinking and arguing
(e.g. Aristotle’s Topics), or even mechanics.16
Inquiry is, then, a very rich subject with influences from and implications for many different areas of philosophy,
most notably epistemology and metaphysics. Detailed investigations of the various topics thus promise to advance our
understanding not only of ancient philosophy but of philosophy more generally. Our tentative map shows that many
inquiry-related topics are central not only to the thought of ancient but also of contemporary philosophy; we therefore
believe that the historian of  philosophy and the contemporary philosopher stand to profit considerably from each
other’s work. This volume offers 10 original contributions to our topic which focus on Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, the
Stoics,  and  the  Skeptics.  In  the  next  section,  we  will  summarize  these  contributions  and point  out  some  of  the
connections these articles have to the different topics identified in the map. 
3 Investigations of Modes of Inquiry in this Volume
Keith Begley turns to the historically earliest author in our issue, Heraclitus. One important element in Heraclitus’
thought concerns, as Begley argues, his views of philosophical inquiry. Heraclitus warns the would-be philosopher not
to be content with polymathy, the acquaintance with many things, as polymathy only provides a naive form of pseudo-
wisdom. Proper philosophical  inquiry,  on the other hand,  has  to seek the unity  of  the things it  investigates.  This
feature, Begley argues, sets Heraclitus apart from the naïve paratactic metaphysics of  his polymathic ancestors and
contemporaries. Indeed, it is through this feature that we may take Heraclitus to be a philosopher and this, according
to Heraclitus is what sets philosophical inquiry apart from, on the one hand, ordinary inquiry, and, again according to
Heraclitus’ view, misguided attempts at understanding nature on the other hand.
As we said, in the past years, research in ancient philosophy has seen a steady rise in publications on the notion and
role of  inquiry. Plato has proved to be a particularly interesting author when it comes to this subject, and a growing
16 See Berryman (2009, 21–22)
number  of  scholars  by  now agree  that  understanding  Platonic  inquiry  is  crucial  to  our  understanding  of  Plato’s
philosophy. Vasilis Politis’ contribution to this issue raises this insight to a new level when he investigates the relation
of Plato’s account of  knowledge and his account of  inquiry as this relation is presented in the Phaedo. Politis argues
that the former is dependent on the latter and that therefore we can only understand Plato’s concept of  knowledge
when  we  understand  his  concept  of  inquiry.  If  Politis  is  right,  it  demonstrates  that  we  should  be  careful  about
attributing to Plato an epistemology or an account of knowledge that can be understood in isolation from his account
of inquiry.17 
Given that one of the self-characterizations of the ancient skeptic school was, according to Sextus Empiricus, to be
zētētikē (disposed to inquire),  engaging with the Skeptics promises to be particularly fruitful for the student of  the
ancient modes of  inquiry. However, inquiring also presented the Skeptics with a problem, as any commitment to a
method  would  threaten  to  damage  their  skeptical  stance,  and,  in  consequence,  would  deny  the  Skeptics  the
tranquillity they desire. This is the problem James Hankinson investigates. Hankinson concludes that Sextus Empiricus
and his branch of  Skepticism can indeed inquire without having a method, or, at any rate, without having a method
which would be problematic in the sense just mentioned. 
Pyrrhonian inquiry, critics argue, aims at tranquility instead of truth; therefore, it is not real inquiry and its aim is
unattractive  to  anyone  but  the  skeptic.  Máté  Veres  argues  that  Pyrrhonian  inquiry,  while  aiming  at  tranquility,
originates in the perplexity that arises when philosophically inclined people encounter conflicting appearances and
that tranquility results from the inquiry brought about by such encounters. He further argues that passages in Plato
and Aristotle demonstrate  that  they,  too,  see philosophical  inquiry as  originating in such encounters,  namely the
encounters with puzzles or difficulties discussed above. The skeptic’s claim that they inquire also on behalf  of  their
dogmatic colleagues is thus less partisan than it might appear: they, like Plato and Aristotle, one may argue, see the
state of perplexity as the origin of philosophy, even if they understand the goal of philosophical inquiry in a radically
different manner.18
A puzzle well-known to philosophers of all ages is presented by Scott Aikin. We begin to philosophize because we
seek to understand how we could become better persons. Soon, however, we realize that in order to investigate that
question we first need to get clear on certain other issues. Put differently, we need to master the various modes of
inquiry, in particular logic, in order to ensure that our inquiry proceeds the way it should. Years later, however, we find
ourselves buried in scholastic distinctions of  technical terms and no closer to answering the question that originally
prompted our inquiry: the means have become ends. Epictetus, Aikin argues, was acutely aware of  this problem and
recommends  that  philosophers  perform  a  double-vision  that  is  directed  at  both  methodological  and  valuational
requirements in order to stay on track.
Evan Rodriguez addresses a particular aspect in Plato’s method of  inquiry. Plato’s methodological debt to sophists
like Gorgias, Rodriguez argues, is greater than common assumptions about this relation would allow.  This concerns in
particular the sophistic method of “playing (or arguing) both sides”, which can be attributed to Gorgias. This method,
Rodriguez argues, has its Platonic counterpart in what could be called “exploring both sides”, an investigative strategy
regularly employed by the Platonic Socrates. Rodriguez thereby casts light on a central feature of Platonic method, the
use of hypotheses; for exploring both sides is, as the Parmenides demonstrates, a mode of hypothetical reasoning, even
if  it  is  not identical  with the use of  hypotheses  discussed in the  Phaedo,  the dialogue most  critics  rely  on when
17 In the contemporary discussion, this possible co-dependence of knowledge and inquiry has recently been considered by Friedmann (2015).
18 The necessity to suspend judgment for a real inquiry to take place has been emphasized not only by the Skeptics and philosophers like Plato
and Aristotle, as Veres shows. It is also a feature of  later philosophers like Descartes, and has recently been picked up again by Friedman
(2015 and 2017). 
discussing  hypothesis  in  Plato.  Indeed,  the  Parmenides suggests  that  exploring  both  sides  is  a  specific  kind  of
hypothetical reasoning that is on a par with other modes of hypothetical reasoning in Plato.
Guy Schuh argues  that  Aristotle  employs  an exploratory  investigative strategy  in the inquiry contained in the
Nicomachean  Ethics.  Aristotle  frequently  posits  positions  that  are  rejected  at  a  later  stage  in  that  inquiry  –  the
reputable opinions discussed above – and Schuh argues that they are introduced also for pedagogical reasons. This
strategy allows Aristotle to tentatively adopt a position that seems attractive but may be incorrect, thereby illustrating
how philosophical inquiry may proceed. Schuh exemplifies this strategy by focusing on three positions central to the
overall  argument  of  the  NE,  positions  that  Schuh  emphasizes  are  rejected  in  the  course  of  that  argument:  that
courageous people  do not  fear  death,  that  friendship consists  in  mutually  recognized goodwill,  and that  virtuous
people engage in virtuous actions for the sake of the actions themselves.
Isocrates famously argued that contemplation or theoria is too demanding for human beings to be worth the effort,
or not to be attainable at all. Analyzing Aristotle’s response to that argument in the Protrepticus, Matthew Walker raises
the question whether or not there is progress in philosophy. In the  Protrepticus Aristotle argues that philosophy is,
overall, easy. This argument, Walker urges, is a neglected source for understanding Aristotle’s ethical views that offers
fresh light on Aristotle’s defense of  the contemplative life that he endorses at the beginning of  his  Metaphysics and
identifies as a requirement for human happiness in the  Nicomachean Ethics. The argument may also prove to be of
benefit to the contemporary discussion: is there progress in philosophy and how is it supposed to be possible?19
Justin Vlasits approaches Pyrrhonian inquiry through Sextus Empiricus’  Outlines of  Pyrrhonism II and argues that
Sextus here presents a unified and ambitious inquiry with the unstated goal of  arguing for the conclusion that we
should suspend judgement on the effectiveness of dogmatic methodologies. In other words, Sextus argues that inquiry
does not stand in need of a method. The claim that Pyrrhonian inquiry, in contrast to dogmatic inquiry, is only sham
inquiry, presupposes that dogmatist inquiry is set apart from skeptical inquiry through a reliable method that leads to
stable truths. Sextus seeks to counter this claim by showing that methodologies employed by dogmatists are deeply
puzzling, that they need to be inquired into, and that the distinction between inquiring through a method and not
doing so is far from clear.
Benjamin Wilck addresses a problem facing the Pyrrhonian skeptic when it comes to suspending judgement about
scientific definitions. The skeptic’s ability to suspend judgement depends on her ability to advance pairs of  equally
convincing arguments or considerations for and against a given proposition. But in Adversus Mathematicos III Sextus
only advances arguments against geometrical definitions, as critics have remarked, and his method looks like negative
dogmatism, not scepticism. Wilck argues that this problem cannot be addressed just by supplying Sextus’ text with
arguments in favour of the definitions he attacks; for ancient geometers did not advance arguments in favour of their
definitions. He then proceeds to evaluate various strategies one may use to supply such arguments.
As we have seen, some contributions touch on some very general questions pertaining to philosophical inquiry, such as
the questions what characterizes philosophical inquiry (Begley), what relation obtains between knowledge and inquiry
(Politis) and whether or not a specific method is needed in order to engage in inquiry (Hankinson). Further general
questions are whether what the Pyrrhonist school is engaged in can be regarded as inquiry (Veres), and whether or not
the modes of inquiry we utilize may end up standing in the very way of the goal of inquiry, i.e. wisdom (Aikin). More
specialized  questions  concern  Plato’s  use  of  hypothetical  reasoning  and  its  connection  to  the  sophist  Gorgias
(Rodriguez), the way the use of reputable opinions structure the inquiry in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Schuh), and
19 According to Walker, Isocrates’ criticism foreshadows the modern criticism of David Chalmers (2015) and that, if Aristotle has a convincing
response to Isocrates, his response might also be effective against Chalmers’ criticism.
whether or not there is progress in philosophy (Walker). Finally we find specific questions pertaining to the mode of
inquiry the Pyrrhonist school engaged in, namely regarding the possibility and necessity of suspending judgement on
the effectiveness of  dogmatic methodologies (i.e. more or less what the intended dogmatists understood under the
heading  of  ‘logic’)  (Vlasits),  and whether  or  not  it  is  possible  to  suspend judgement  on mathematical  principles
through the creation of  equipollence (Wilck). We hope that these contributions will intensify interest in the topic of
inquiry in the scholarly community and help stimulate future research into inquiry. As our introduction has hopefully
made clear, this volume engaged with just a fraction of the subject-matter. The explorer who wishes to investigate the
question how different modes of inquiry have structured and continue to structure our very conception of philosophy
faces a largely uncharted territory that is bound to offer new vantage points from which we may look at the regions of
philosophy we think we already know with fresh eyes.
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